Act this weekWhat happenedAn attacker used credentials for the Amazon account Qubole uses to reach customers, then stole stored secrets and data from several customer accounts between October 14 and October 26.
Who is affectedAny organization that has connected Qubole, a data platform owned by Idera, to its Amazon Web Services (AWS) account, including ones that no longer use it.
What to do- 1Check your AWS CloudTrail logs from October 1 onward for access requests from Qubole's account, 805246085872, coming from outside AWS.
- 2If you find any, review everything that session did, especially in Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, Lambda and S3.
- 3Replace any passwords, access keys and client secrets that were stored in those places.
- 4Remove Qubole access you no longer need, and turn on S3 data event logging so future file reads are recorded.
Between October 14 and October 26, an attacker broke into the Amazon Web Services (AWS) accounts of several Qubole customers and stole stored passwords and data, security firm Wiz said. The attacker did not break each company's defenses one by one. It used credentials for the AWS account that Qubole itself uses to reach its customers.
What happened
Qubole is a data lake platform owned by Idera. A data lake is a large store of company data. Qubole works inside its customers' AWS accounts. To allow that, a customer creates a role, which is an AWS identity with its own set of permissions. The role is set to trust Qubole's AWS account.
Each request to use the role must include a code called an External ID. That code is not a secret, though. AWS guidance says anyone with access to the role can see it. So when the attacker's requests came from the trusted account with the right code, AWS let them in. How the attacker got those credentials has not been disclosed.
What the attacker took
Wiz's researchers say the attacker went hunting for stored logins, then tested them with a tool called TruffleHog to see which ones worked. It also copied files out of S3, Amazon's file storage. It took data from any storage bucket a role could reach, sometimes an entire bucket in one session. The loot included:
- Customers' own AWS access keys
- Entra ID client secrets
- Okta client credentials
- Stored company data
Who it affects
Any organization that has connected Qubole to AWS should take this seriously, including ones that no longer use it. Wiz found that most of the roles the attacker used were sitting idle. They still trusted Qubole's account, so they still worked. Companies that never linked Qubole to AWS are not covered by this warning.
A separate set of break-ins ran from October 8 to October 11. In those, an attacker used customers' own AWS access keys, which the researchers believe had been set up for Qubole. A few victims' cloud environments were compromised. This has not been linked to the main attack.
What to do
The steps in the alert box above walk through what to check and fix. One point deserves emphasis. Regular AWS logs show that a role was used, but not which files were read. Several victims lacked the extra logs, so responders could not tell which files the attacker saw.
What is not known yet
Wiz did not say whether the stolen credentials have been shut off or whether the activity has stopped. Neither Qubole nor Idera had posted a statement on their websites when The Hacker News checked. Wiz has not tied the attack to any other known group, and says the targets do not look like those of state-backed hackers. Sentra spotted the activity in several of its customers' environments and alerted the researchers.
The takeawayIf your business ever linked Qubole to AWS, check your logs from October 1 onward and remove any access you no longer need.